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David Godden has written a rich paper that makes one think about a lot of things. The 
scope of the paper is not restricted to the issue of Deductivism. For instance the claim that the 
Theory of Analysis needs to be independent of the Theory of Appraisal will be relevant for an 
assessment of Positivism and Conductivism as well (Cf. Johnson 2000, 45, 81. 84). I shall have 
to restrict my comment to a few issues. First, I want to have a closer look at different kinds of 
argument appraisal and argument analysis (Section 1). Then, I shall challenge the idea that the 
Theory of Analysis is independent of the Theory of Appraisal (Section 2), and see what follows 
for Deductivism (Section 3). I shall briefly discuss some of Godden's arguments against 
Deductivism (Section 4), and shall end with some conclusions (Section 5). 
 
 
1. Goals of Analyses and Appraisals 
 
A large part of David Godden's paper is devoted to a critical assessment of deductivistic 
reconstruction as an approach to the analysis of arguments. But whether Deductivism, or any 
other approach, can provide us with a good strategy of analysis (interpretative strategy) depends 
on what the analysis is supposed to achieve. Godden's interest is with arguments actually 
transacted (situated, natural arguments, or arguments on the hoof, as John Woods would say), 
with their analysis, and with their appraisal. The ultimate goal is the appraisal of these 
arguments; but to appraise them we must know what they are, and for this we need a Theory of 
Analysis: to tell us what this or that argument really is. Deductivism as a Theory of Analysis 
(that is: the interpretative strategy of understanding arguments as attempts to present deductively 
valid arguments) is one candidate that promises to fit the bill. 
 Different kinds of argument appraisal may be distinguished according to their different 
purposes. A participant in dialogue, for instance, may want to spot the weak points in her 
opponent's argument, in order to be able to best select her next move. A reader of an essay 
written in objection to a road building project may be primarily interested in whether or not he 
will now accept the conclusion. These are two types of participant situations. But, besides 
participant situations, there are spectator situations (cf. Govier 1987, 128). And again, spectators 
may orient them themselves towards various companies of discussants that differ in their 
normative standards about what constitutes a good argument. 
 Now one may wonder whether one and the same strategy of analysis of an argument 
suffices for all these different kinds of appraisal. Can we suppose there is something which is 
really the argument transacted, and that this object is just appraised from different perspectives? 
Or could it be that different kinds of appraisal pertain to different objects, and therefore 
presuppose a different kind of analysis? And if so, might it not be that Deductivism as a Theory 
of Analysis provides a good strategy for some kinds of appraisal, but not for others? For instance, 
could it be a good strategy when looking for "issues that need to be addressed in dialectical 
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exchange" (Groarke 1999, 9), but a poor one when a fast decision on whether to accept the 
conclusion is called for? In that case The Theory of Analysis would be dependent upon the 
Theory of Appraisal. But Godden claims the first must remain completely independent of the 
second.  
 
 
2. Is the Theory of Analysis Independent of the Theory of Appraisal? 
 
According to Godden, the descriptive project (finding out what the argument is) must 
remain completely independent from the evaluative one (the critical assessment). Though, no 
doubt, these two need to be carefully distinguished, I cannot at present agree with the idea that 
the former is wholly independent of the latter. However, if one accepts this idea of independence, 
it is clear that Deductivism as a Theory of Analysis won't work. A deductivist interpretative 
strategy in argument analysis tries to reconstruct arguments as valid. Since 'validity' is a concept 
from the Theory of Appraisal, deductivist strategies will mix things up. 
 This fast dismissal of Deductivism as a Theory of Analysis fails if one tolerates that the 
Theory of Analysis be, to a certain extent, informed by the Theory of Appraisal. In my view, we 
hardly have a choice in the matter, given that a purely descriptive approach to argument is 
impossible. But why is it impossible? The reason is a general one, and therefore rather trivial. It's 
the observation that describing any human activity is rather pointless if one does not take into 
account the point of the activity. For instance, what to say about a game of soccer? Why run after 
a ball of leather and then, when you finally get it, kick it away again? A physical description of 
the movements of players in the field misses the point; it doesn't get to the argument of the play. 
It will not do as a description preparing for evaluation. Neither will the hustle and bustle on the 
stock exchange make much sense when described in physical terms. Nor does your web page in 
machine language.  
 Similarly, argumentation must be described as a goal-directed activity, and to describe it 
in that way one needs normative concepts. The natural place to find these concepts is the Theory 
of Appraisal. Therefore, the Theory of Analysis must borrow some concepts from the Theory of 
Appraisal and cannot in all respects be independent of it.  
 
 
3. Consequences for Deductivism as a Theory of Analysis 
 
According to Deductivism as a Theory of Analysis, the interpretative strategy to be used 
in argument analysis makes one understand these arguments as attempts to put forward 
deductively valid arguments. Here the concept of "deductive validity" has been borrowed from 
the Theory of Appraisal. But if there is any good in what was said in the preceding section, this 
need not be held against Deductivism. 
 Of course, it does not follow that Deductivism provides what is in all respects a good 
Theory of Analysis. Let alone that its type of analysis would be good for all different purposes of 
argument appraisal. Deductivism may give us the right interpretative strategy for the "game of 
deductive persuasion", but not for that of other persuasion games. In fact, Godden presents some 
good arguments that detract from Deductivism's plausibility as a universally applicable strategy.  
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4. Does Deductivism provide a good strategy? 
 
As Godden remarks in Section 6 of his paper: if Deductivism as a Theory of Appraisal 
were true, that is, if all good arguments were deductively valid, so would Deductivism as a 
Theory of Analysis. But in Section 9 of his paper it is shown that Deductivism as a Theory of 
Appraisal fails. There are other standards of evidence than that of validity and these standards 
cannot, generally, be reduced to validity. Therefore, it is not the case that only deductively valid 
arguments are good arguments. 
 To lend plausibility to the claim that a reduction of other standards to the validity 
standard is not feasible, Godden points out that deductively valid arguments are incapable of 
carrying evaluative predicates such as 'probability' or 'plausibility' from premises to conclusion. 
We know that if C follows deductively from A and B, and A and B are both true, C must also be 
true. And the same may perhaps be said for 'certainty'. (And for 'necessity' and 'possibility' we 
may add.) But if C follows deductively from A and B, and both A and B are probable (to a 
certain degree), C need not be probable (to the same degree). This is illustrated by the Lottery 
Paradox. Therefore, probable arguments cannot, generally, be reconstructed as deductive 
arguments from probable premises to probable conclusions. And therefore there is an irreducible 
plurality of standards of evidence. 
 I think this is an interesting argument, even though it does not exclude that other methods 
of reduction may be put forward. A closer analysis of the ways deductive (and other) standards of 
evidence relate to ways of fixing commitments is also needed. 
 In Section 10 of his paper, Godden shows the weakness of the so-called semantic 
arguments for Deductivism. 
 In his Section 11, Godden admits that theorists may sometimes have a special interest in 
deductive validity. In such cases he advises the deductivists to split the defense: Deductivism 
may, in circumstances, provide a good evaluative strategy (applying deductive standards, 
presumably without claiming that these are the only ones) but a bad interpretative one. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
(1) I think David Godden and I agree that there is no proof up till now for the correctness of 
Deductivism, either as a Theory of Appraisal or as a Theory of Analysis. 
(2) On the other hand, there is no proof either that Deductivism of either type cannot provide a 
good strategy in a number of types of context. If only because showing that the arguments of the 
deductivists are not cogent does not suffice to dismiss their position. 
(3) Theorists can have a legitimate interest in deductive standards, for this they do not need to 
subscribe to either kind of Deductivism. 
(4) Contrary to what David Godden supposes, I think it is legitimate to let the Theory of Analysis 
be informed by the Theory of Appraisal, to some extent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
E. Krabbe’s commentary on D. Godden’s “Reconstruction and Representation: Deductivism as an Interpretive Strategy” 
References 
 
Govier, Trudy. 1987. Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation. Dordrecht and 
Providence, RI: Foris. 
 
Groarke, Leo. 1999. "Deductivism Within Pragma-Dialectics," Argumentation: An International 
Journal on Reasoning 13 (1): 1-16.  
 
Johnson, Ralph H. 2000. Manifest Rationality: A Pragmatic Theory of Argument. Mahwah, NJ, 
and London: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
 4 
